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Diffusion of Cooperative Behavior in Decentralized
Cognitive Radio Networks with Selfish Spectrum
Sensors
Amitav Mukherjee
Abstract—This work investigates the diffusion of cooperative
behavior over time in a decentralized cognitive radio network
with selfish spectrum-sensing users. The users can individually
choose whether or not to participate in cooperative spectrum
sensing, in order to maximize their individual payoff defined
in terms of the sensing false-alarm rate and transmit energy
expenditure. The system is modeled as a partially connected
network with a statistical distribution of the degree of the users,
who play their myopic best responses to the actions of their
neighbors at each iteration. Based on this model, we investigate
the existence and characterization of Bayesian Nash Equilibria
for the diffusion game. The impacts of network topology, channel
fading statistics, sensing protocol, and multiple antennas on the
outcome of the diffusion process are analyzed next. Simulation
results that demonstrate how conducive different network sce-
narios are to the diffusion of cooperation are presented for
further insight, and we conclude with a discussion on additional
refinements and issues worth pursuing.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, cooperative spectrum sensing,
diffusion, network games, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) by interweave cognitive
radios (ICRs) is emerging as a promising solution to enable
better utilization of the radio spectrum, especially in bands that
are currently under-utilized [1], [2]. DSA partitions wireless
terminals into categories of primary (licensed) and secondary
(cognitive radio) users, where the primary users (PUs) have
priority in accessing the shared spectrum. ICRs are allowed to
opportunistically use the spectrum only when it is not occupied
by primary transmitters (PTs) that have priority. Therefore, the
ICRs do not cause interference to the PUs in principle. In the
absence of standard control channels or coordinated medium
access between the primary and secondary users, the ICRs
must periodically sense the spectrum for the presence of PTs
and cease transmission upon detection. Local spectrum sensing
(LSS) algorithms where each ICR makes an independent
decision on whether the spectrum is available have been
studied extensively, e.g., [3]–[6].
LSS may fail to provide sufficient accuracy due to the
vagaries of the wireless medium such as deep fades and
shadowing. As a remedy, cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS)
has been shown to greatly increase the reliability of spectrum
sensing, with a corresponding increase in complexity and
energy consumption [7]. Under CSS, each ICR either sends
its local sensing data/decision to a central collector known as
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the fusion center [8]-[14], or shares this information with its
neighbors in the case of distributed ICR networks [15]-[16].
However, the fundamental assumption in the CSS studies cited
thus far is that all ICRs willingly engage in cooperative sensing
in order to optimize a global performance metric. In decentral-
ized networks, ICRs can potentially pursue selfish motives and
make independent decisions regarding whether to cooperate
with their peers via CSS or to act alone by adopting LSS.
Therefore, there has been recent interest in game-theoretic
models of decentralized networks where ICRs act selfishly
in order maximize individual utilities [17]-[22]. Yuan et al.
[17] study generalized Nash Equilibria of a non-cooperative
game where the ICR throughput features in the utility func-
tion. Evolutionary game models and associated evolutionary
stable strategies with throughput as payoffs are formulated in
[18], [19]. Cooperative game-theoretic approach for coalition
formation in fixed network topologies are presented in [20],
[21], while [22] assumes the presence of a fusion center
and ICRs non-cooperatively optimize the frequency over time
with which they participate in CSS. This paper has several
major differences from [17]-[22] as we analyze Bayesian
Nash Equilibria under an imperfect information scenario, base
the ICR utility function on the sensing false-alarm rate, and
explicitly consider a complex, partially-connected network
topology with an arbitrary degree distribution.
On a broader level, there has been extensive recent work
on distributed estimation or detection of a single parameter of
interest without the need for a central fusion center. Diffusion
strategies for distributed estimation/detection in decentralized
networks where all users cooperate have been studied in
[23]-[28], for example. Consensus algorithms for in-network
computation have been presented in [15], [16], [29] among
others. While [15], [16], [23]-[29] focus on the diffusion of
information between collaborating peers, this work is focused
on the diffusion of cooperation across a decentralized inter-
weave network composed of selfish users. In other words,
we are interested in determining conditions under which a
given ICR network converges towards or diverges away from
global cooperation over time when users individually adapt to
the behavior of their peers, with information exchange being
implicit.
The motivation to study the diffusion of cooperation is
as follows. The autonomous nature of the distributed ICR
network makes it difficult for the cognitive network designer
to predict the behavior of the ICRs, and whether a steady-state
outcome exists for the network as a whole, in terms of what
2fraction of ICRs end up cooperating. This is a critical question,
since the fundamental basis of deploying spectrum-sensing
ICRs is to maximize the utilization of unused spectrum -
which is achieved when the ICR false-alarm rate is minimized
(subject to a primary detection probability constraint). As
the per-ICR false-alarm rate is minimized when all ICRs
participate in CSS, studying the diffusion of cooperation in
the network and the corresponding steady-state properties
illustrates how close or far the distributed network is from this
ideal outcome. The diffusion analysis in this work shows how
key physical and network parameters such as sensing protocol,
network degree distribution, number of antennas, shadowing
correlation and path loss exponent, etc. impact the steady-state
cooperation outcomes of the distributed ICR network.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces
the mathematical model of the decentralized ICR network and
the spectrum sensing performance of the ICRs. The game-
theoretic model and equilibrium properties of the diffusion
process are presented in Sec. III. Sec. IV examines the
impact of various network and sensing parameters on the
diffusion process. Selected numerical examples are shown in
Section V followed by a discussion of further research issues
in Section VI, and we conclude in Section VII.
Notation: We will use N (m,Z) to denote a multivari-
ate Gaussian distribution with mean m and covariance ma-
trix Z, and define the Gaussian Q-function as Q (x) =(√
2π
)−1 ∫∞
x
e−u
2/2du. We also use E{·} to denote expecta-
tion, (·)T for the transpose, (·)H for the Hermitian transpose,
(·)−1 for the matrix inverse, x−i to denote a vector excluding
its ith component, [A]i,j is the (i, j) element of matrix A,
and 1 is a column vector of all ones.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
A. Network Model
Primary transmitterdi=5
di=2
LSS
CSS
G
di=0
Fig. 1. Decentralized ICR network with cooperative and non-cooperative
users of various degrees.
As shown in Fig. 1, the system under consideration is
composed of a PT and n single-antenna ICRs that form
a partially-connected network represented by the undirected
graph G (V,E), with V = 1, . . . , n, and E being the set of
edges or active peer-to-peer links. The ith ICR has a degree
di drawn from a probability distribution P (d) with support
d = 0, 1, . . . , D, such that
∑D
d=0 P (d) = 1. Each ICR is
provided prior knowledge of the degree distribution P (d) of
the overall network by the network designer and knows its own
degree di, but does not have any knowledge of the degrees of
its neighbors. The network is decentralized in the sense that no
central fusion center is present, and only localized peer-to-peer
interactions are allowed.
At each time instant of the diffusion process (to be defined
in Sec. III), the neighbors of each user are a random draw from
the population specified by P (d), which indicates that a new
network realization is perceived at every interaction epoch1.
However, the degree of each ICR remains unchanged over
time. By definition, degree distribution P (d) characterizes the
degree of an arbitrary node anywhere in the network. We are
now interested in the degree distribution P˜ (d) of a neighboring
node, i.e., given some node i with degree di, what is the degree
distribution of its jth neighbor? It is immediately clear that
this is not also equal to P (d), since P (d) includes degree-0
nodes in its support that have no neighbors. Instead, consider
a randomly chosen edge (link) in the network graph, which by
definition exists between neighboring nodes. Once again, the
degree of a node we reach by following a randomly chosen
edge is not given by P (d). Since there are d edges that arrive
at a node of degree d, we are d times as likely to arrive at that
node than another node that has degree 1. Thus, the probability
that the neighboring node is of degree d is proportional to
P (d)d; normalizing to yield a valid distribution function we
obtain [30]
P˜ (d) =
P (d) d∑
d P (d) d
. (1)
B. Spectrum Sensing Protocol
We now specify the spectrum sensing algorithm employed
by the ICRs to detect the presence of the PT. Assume that
the ICRs are allowed to access the spectrum only if they are
located outside a guard region of radius G centered on the
PT. Let yi denote the SNR in dB (logarithmic scale) of the
PT signal received at ICR i located at a distance ri from the
PT. Under log-normal shadowing and distance-dependent path
loss on the sensing channel, yi is distributed as a Gaussian
random variable with variance σ2 and mean µ(ri) [11], [12].
For the CSS scenario with a cluster of c cooperating ICRs,
the local SNRs are collected into y = [y1, . . . , yc]T at a
randomly chosen participant within the group. We assume each
ICR truthfully reports its actual local observation during CSS,
and defer discussion of malicious behavior to Sec. VI. Since
the inter-neighbor distances are much smaller in magnitude
compared to {ri}ci=1, we assume that the SNR reporting is
conducted without error or delay, and that the cooperating
1This assumption is consistent with a mean-field approximation as elabo-
rated upon in Sec. III-C.
3ICRs are all roughly the same distance from the PT: r1 ≈
r2 ≈ . . . ≈ rc = r [12]-[13]. However, the small intra-cluster
size also implies that the SNR observations are correlated, such
that the normalized covariance matrix Σ = σ−2E {yyH} is
non-diagonal and of full rank.
Therefore, the binary hypothesis test under CSS to deter-
mine whether the cooperating cluster is within the guard region
(hypothesis H0) or not (hypothesis H1) is
H0 : y ∼ N
(
µ (r) 1, σ2Σ
)
, (2)
H1 : y ∼ N
(
µ (r + δ)1, σ2Σ
)
, (3)
for some δ > 0. We assume that both CSS and LSS must
achieve a minimum probability of detection target β, equiv-
alent to a missed-detection probability constraint of (1 − β).
The imposition of the constraint β ensures a minimum level
of protection for the PUs from unintentional ICR interference.
The Neyman-Pearson-optimal likelihood ratio test [31] that
minimizes the probability of false alarm subject to the con-
straint β is given by the decision rule [12]
1TΣ−1y
1TΣ−11
H1
≷
H0
T
with threshold T = µ (G) − Q−1 (β). Define ∆δ ≡
µ (R+ δ)−µ (R), ∆δ < 0. Under an exponential spatial cor-
relation model [Σ]i,j = ρ|i−j|, the corresponding probability
of false alarm can be approximated as [11]
PFA,CSS (c) = 1−Q
(
∆δ
σ
√
(1− ρ) c+ 2ρ
1 + ρ
+Q−1 (β)
)
.
(4)
The false alarm probability under LSS is easily obtained from
(4) as
PFA,LSS = 1−Q
(
∆δ
σ
+Q−1 (β)
)
. (5)
At first glance, the primary users appear to be equally
protected from ICR interference under LSS and CSS, due
to the detection probability constraint β imposed on both
scenarios. However, from the perspective of the secondary
network designer it is always desirable to have as many ICRs
cooperate as possible. Since PFA,CSS (c) is monotonically
decreasing in c, reducing the false-alarm probability via CSS
greatly improves the spectrum access opportunities of the
ICRs. The reader is referred to [7], [32] for specific details on
protocols for CSS information exchange and medium access
control after the sensing decisions.
C. Cost of Cooperation
The increased complexity of CSS incurs an additional cost
in terms of energy consumption and delay relative to LSS
[17]. Since the diffusion process is iterative by definition, we
assume the additional delay due to CSS is negligible compared
to the diffusion time scale. The cost of additional energy
consumption in reporting SNRs/decisions to a neighbor is
modeled as follows. Assume that other ICRs in the proximity
of arbitrary user i are its neighbors if they lie within a circle
of radius R centered at i, with a total of di such ICRs. R is
thus assumed to be the maximum communication range of the
ICRs. Let random variable Y represent the distance between
neighboring ICRs. The energy consumed by ICR i when it
participates in CSS (incurred while either reporting yi or the
CSS decision) is assumed to be proportional to Y α:
E = cY α (6)
with α as the path loss exponent of the network, and some
proportionality constant c > 0.
In sophisticated network geometry models, the user loca-
tions are often assumed to be governed by a two-dimensional
stochastic point process [33]. Assuming n is asymptotically
large, we can apply a Poisson point process (PPP) model of
example intensity
µ = π(R +D)2/n
where D ≫ R, for which the cdf of the distance to the nearest
neighbor [34] is
FY (y) = 1− e−µpiy2 . (7)
The cdf of the energy cost is then obtained as
FE (x) = 1− e−µpic−2/αx2/α . (8)
We can similarly compute the cost distribution for various
other statistical models of the user spatial locations. More
generally, in the terminology of Bayesian game theory we
can define the degree of a neighboring ICR and energy
cost as its ‘type’, which is private information known only
to itself. However, the statistical distribution of each user’s
type is publicly known to all nodes, which is a standard
assumption in Bayesian games [35]. Furthermore, note that we
can replace the CSS and LSS protocols described above by any
arbitrary choice of decision rule (e.g., energy detection, feature
detection, hard decision combining) without altering the game-
theoretic analysis of the diffusion process in the sequel.
III. DIFFUSION NETWORK GAME
A. Strategic Non-cooperative Game
Having delineated the statistical properties of the ICR
network and spectrum sensing protocols, we now model the
diffusion process as a non-cooperative game that evolves over
discrete time steps t = 0, 1, . . . , L. Every ICR has a (pure)
strategy set of two possible actions A = {0, 1} and plays
a ∈ A, where action a = 0 corresponds to LSS and a = 1
corresponds to choosing CSS. Let xt represent the probability
at time t that an arbitrary neighbor anywhere in the network
chooses to cooperate by playing a = 1. Generally, an ICR
may participate in multiple clusters at a time. In that sense xtd
is an approximation of the number of cooperative neighbors.
Due to the communication range limit R and the fact that the
CSS outcome is broadcast by the local cluster-head, all ICRs
within a cluster are assumed to be direct neighbors of each
other. The probability that each ICR participates in more than
one cluster per time step is therefore considered to be small.
We then define the utility obtained by a degree-di ICR when
it chooses to cooperate as
udi
(
1, xt
)
= 1− PFA,CSS
(
xtdi
) (9)
4where PFA,CSS (·) is the cooperative false-alarm rate defined
in (4). The additional energy cost incurred by ICR i under CSS
is represented by Ei drawn from distribution FE(x) [cf. (8)],
and costs are i.i.d. across ICRs. Similarly, ICRs abstaining
from cooperation obtain
udi
(
0, xt
)
= 1− PFA,LSS . (10)
The false-alarm probability is meaningful as a utility function
since it has a direct impact on the ICR throughput. Since
ICRs must refrain from transmission if they decide that a
primary user is active, a higher false alarm rate corresponds to
decreased opportunities for spectrum access. Therefore, max-
imizing the ICR utility function is equivalent to minimizing
the false-alarm rate, which is desirable for all ICRs.
The return function v(di, xt) represents the additional utility
gained by a degree-di user that chooses to cooperate:
v
(
di, x
t
)
= udi
(
1, xt
)− udi (0, xt) . (11)
The user payoff functions are finally given by
Πdi
(
a, xt
)
=
{
udi (1, x
t)− ci, a = 1
udi (0, x
t) , a = 0.
(12)
From (9)-(12), we observe that (i) udi (0, xt) = udi (a, 0),
(ii) udi (a, x˜t) ≥ udi (a, xt) if x˜t ≥ xt which implies the
utilities exhibit positive externalities, and (iii) udi (1, xt) >
udi (0, x
t) ∀di > 0, xt > 0. Therefore, a selfish ICR has an
incentive to participate in CSS if and only if v (di, xt) ≥ Ei,
which occurs with probability
Pr{v (di, xt)} ≥ Ei} = FE (v (di, xt)) . (13)
At each time step, the ICRs play their myopic best responses
bi (a−i) = argmax
a∈A
Πdi
(
a, xt
) ∀i (14)
to maximize their individual payoffs, based on the expected
behavior of their neighbors parameterized by xt. The diffusion
of cooperation through the network is then captured by the
evolution of xt over time. The game model is one of incom-
plete information since each user is assumed to know only its
own degree and cost; the degree and cost realizations of its
neighbors are completely unknown. Our game model therefore
differs significantly from [17], where the utilities are defined in
terms of throughput and a joint detection probability constraint
is applied to all ICRs under CSS, leading to a coupled strategy
space. The non-cooperative diffusion network game in strate-
gic form is succinctly represented as Γd (V,A,Πdi (a, xt)).
For the incomplete information scenario, steady-state rest
points of the diffusion process are described by Bayesian Nash
Equilibria (BNE) [35], which we characterize next.
B. Structure of Equilibria
Theorem 1: The set of Bayesian Nash Equilibria of the
diffusion network game Γd (V,A,Πdi (a, xt)) is non-empty.
Proof: The ICR strategy set A = {0, 1} is a compact
subset over R, or equivalently, a sublattice of R. The return
function v(di, xt) is increasing in xt for each feasible value
of di, which can be verified either by inspection of (11), or
by verifying that its first derivative
dv (di, x
t)
dxt
=− 1√
2π
e
(
−∆δ
σ
√
((1−ρ)xtdi+2ρ)/1+ρ+Q−1(β)
)
× ∆δ
2σ
√
1 + ρ
(1− ρ)xtdi
((1− ρ)xtdi + 2ρ)1/2
(15)
is positive (recall that ∆δ < 0). The same is true for the
individual utility functions and for the payoff Πdi (a, xt).
Thus, the best response correspondence bi is an increasing
function on A [36], [37]. Define b =∏i bi as the overall best
response correspondence obtained from the Cartesian product
of the individual responses; b is also an increasing function.
Now, Tarski’s fixed point theorem [35], [38] states that “Let
(S;≥) with binary relation ‘ ≥′ be a non-empty compact
sublattice of Rn and f : S → S an increasing function on
S, such that for x, y ∈ S, y ≥ x implies f(y) ≥ f(x). Then
the set of fixed points of f is non-empty.” Therefore, based
on the preceding discussion, the best response correspondence
b :
∏
iA →
∏
iA has a non-empty set of fixed points. Since
the set of fixed points of a best response correspondence is
the set of pure BNE [35], Theorem 1 follows.
The result in Theorem 1 is refined further as follows.
Theorem 2: The strategic diffusion network game
Γd (V,A,Πdi (a, xt)) has a unique BNE in pure strategies.
Proof: For Γd (V,A,Πdi (a, xt)) to have a unique BNE,
it suffices to show that the probability of cooperation
FE (v (di, x
t)) is concave in xt for each di [36]. Defining
η = (1− ρ)xtdi+2ρ, we first verify that v (di, xt) is concave
by computing its second derivative
d2v(di,xt)
dxt2
= −∆δ((1−ρ)di)2
2σ
√
2pi(1+ρ)
e−0.5(
∆δ
σ
√
η
(1+ρ)
+Q−1(β))
2
×
[
η−1
(
−∆δ
σ
√
η
(1+ρ) +Q
−1 (β)
)(
∆δ
σ
√
(1+ρ)
)
− 0.5η−1.5
]
which is non-positive for each di. For the PPP spatial model,
the cost distribution in (8) is concave in x since the second
derivative
d2FE (x)
dx2
=
2
α
c˜x(2−2α)/αe−c˜x
2/α
(
2− α− 2c˜x2
α
)
is negative, where we have defined c˜ = µπc−2/α.
FE (v (di, x
t)) for the PPP model is the composition of
two concave functions, therefore it is also concave in xt.
A fixed-point characterization of the unique BNE can be
obtained as follows. Since P˜ (d) is the probability of having
a neighbor of degree d and FE (v (di, xt)) is the probability
that a neighbor cooperates, due to the law of total probability
we have
xt = φ
(
xt
)
,
∑
d
P˜ (d)FE
(
v
(
d, xt
))
. (16)
From Theorem 2, the BNE of the diffusion game must satisfy
(16), and the point satisfying (16) must be the BNE [36].
The final piece of the puzzle relates to the achievability of
the unique BNE specified above, which is resolved next. We
will make use of the notion of a supermodular game with
positive externalities, where user payoffs are increasing in the
5actions of their neighbors [39], [40]. In other words, in a
supermodular game the actions of users mutually reinforce
the decisions of their neighbors to follow the same action.
A classic example is the power control game in distributed
networks; an increase in the perceived interference power at a
node triggers it to also increase its own transmit power, and
so on [39].
Theorem 3: The myopic best response dynamics of the
selfish ICRs in (14) is guaranteed to converge to the unique
BNE of Γd (V,A,Πdi (a, xt)).
Proof: Note that Πdi (a, xt) is upper semi-continuous in
a as the player transitions from a = 0 to a = 1. Furthermore,
the payoff function satisfies the property of having increasing
differences in (a, a−i), i.e.,
Πdi
({a′i, a′−i}, xt)−Πdi ({ai, a′−i}, xt) ≥ Πdi ({a′i, a−i}, xt)
−Πdi
({ai, a−i}, xt)
for all a′i ≥ ai and a′−i ≥ a−i. We have already mentioned
that A is a sublattice of R. Therefore, Γd (V,A,Πdi (a, xt))
satisfies the properties of a supermodular game with positive
externalities [39], [40], and it is known that myopic best
responses always converge to equilibrium in such games [35],
[41].
The existence and achievability of a unique BNE as shown
above is especially useful since n-player supermodular games
with two actions per player can have up to
⌈
n
2
⌉
pure-strategy
BNE in general [42]. The algorithmic description of the
Bayesian CSS diffusion game introduced in this section is
summarized below.
Algorithm Bayesian CSS diffusion game
Require: 0 < ǫ ≤ 10−3, t = 0
Initialization:
Initialize x0 with a random number between 0 and 1; t =
t+ 1
while
∣∣φ (xt+1)− φ (xt)∣∣ > ǫ do
ICRs play best-response strategies
bi (a−i) = argmax
a∈A
Πdi (a, x
t) ∀i
Update φ
(
xt+1
)
via fixed-point eq. (16); t = t+ 1
end while
C. Time Dynamics of Diffusion Process
Having established the properties of steady-state equilibria,
it is also of interest to examine the evolution of the diffusion
process over time. Since each ICR can be in one of two
states (cooperative or non-cooperative) at each time instant,
the diffusion process dynamics is a discrete-time Markov chain
with n2 possible states. A mean-field approximation alleviates
the complexity of such stochastic dynamics by replacing
the Markov-chain model with a deterministic discrete-time
process. This approximation relies on the stochastic process
remaining in the same subset space with a probability arbitrar-
ily close to one, provided that the population is large enough
[30]. The analytical complexity is further reduced by assuming
that at each time instant the neighbors of each ICR are drawn
randomly from the population. Therefore, the network degree
distribution P (d) can be used to characterize the diffusion
process instead of having to account for all possible network
connections and topologies, which is nearly intractable [30],
[36], [43].
An important metric that captures the evolution of the
cooperative behavior of the network is the relative density
(fraction) of cooperating ICRs ξt at time t. By definition, we
have
ξt =
∑
k
P (k) ξtk (17)
where ξtk is the relative density of degree-k cooperative ICRs.
Assuming the increments in time are arbitrarily small, the
dynamic mean-field equation can be written as
dξtk
dt
= −ξtk
(
1− FE
(
v
(
k, xt
)))
+ ξtkFE
(
v
(
k, xt
))
.
Setting the derivative to zero yields the stationary condition
ξtk = FE (v (k, x
t)). Thus at a steady-state BNE, we have
ξtNE =
∑
k
P (k)FE
(
v
(
k, xt
))
, (18)
which verifies that ξt is increasing in xt due to FE (v (k, xt))
having the same property.
IV. DIFFUSION OUTCOMES
A. Impact of Network Parameters
The network parameters that potentially impact the outcome
of the diffusion process are
• Network degree distribution P (d) or P˜ (d).
• PT detection constraint β.
• Energy cost distribution FE(x).
• Sensing protocol.
• Shadowing correlation and path loss exponent.
Changes in any of the above parameters will either lead to a
lower or higher equilibrium value of xt. Furthermore, some
of these parameters are coupled and cannot be manipulated
independently, for e.g., varying the path loss exponent will
also alter the energy cost distribution. The network mapping
φ (xt) defined in (16) offers a means of comparing the extent
to which cooperation spreads in different networks. Given two
networks that differ in one parameter with all others being the
same, we now present a framework to evaluate which of the
two is more conducive to the diffusion of cooperation. We will
require the following definitions.
Definition 1: Given two random variables A and B with
distribution functions FA(y) and FB(y), if FA(y) ≥ FB(y)
∀y ∈ R, then A is first-order stochastically dominated by B,
denoted as B  A.
Definition 2: A network with map φ′ (xt) is said to be more
conducive to diffusion compared to map φ (xt) if φ (xt) ≤
φ˜ (xt) for each xt, since that is equivalent to φ˜ (xt) having a
higher BNE point xt. If the converse holds then the network
φ′ (xt) is less conducive to diffusion.
We can then summarize the impact of varying a specific
network parameter while fixing the remainder as follows.
• Varying P˜ (d): If P˜ (d)  P˜ ′(d), then φ (xt) =∑
d P˜ (d)FE (v (d, x
t)) ≥ ∑d P˜ ′ (d)FE (v (di, xt)) =
6φ˜′ (xt). Increasing the probability of higher-degree neigh-
bors aids diffusion.
• Varying β: The false-alarm probability of any feasible
decision rule is non-decreasing in β (property of any
receiver operating characteristic). For β′ ≤ β, we have
P ′FA,CSS(c) ≤ PFA,CSS(c) and P ′FA,LSS ≤ PFA,LSS .
This implies v′(di, xt) ≥ v(di, xt) and FE (v′ (di, xt)) ≥
FE (v (di, x
t)), therefore φ′ (xt) ≥ φ (xt). Lowering the
detection probability constraint increases the gain from
CSS while the cost remains unchanged, thus enhancing
diffusion.
• Varying FE(x): It is obvious that for FE(x)  F ′E(x),
we have φ′ (xt) ≤ φ (xt). Increasing the cost of cooper-
ation can only hinder the diffusion process.
• Varying the sensing protocol: Since the sensing pro-
tocols in Sec. II-B are Neyman-Pearson optimal, for any
competing sensing protocol with metrics P ′FA,CSS(c) and
P ′FA,LSS , we must have P ′FA,CSS(c) ≥ PFA,CSS(c) and
P ′FA,LSS ≥ PFA,LSS for the same detection constraint
β. This implies v′(di, xt) ≤ v(di, xt) and ultimately
φ′ (xt) ≤ φ (xt). Deviating from the optimal likelihood
ratio test decreases the likelihood of cooperation.
• Varying ρ: For shadowing correlation coefficients ρ and
ρ′, if ρ′ ≥ ρ, since the term √((1− ρ) c+ 2ρ)/1 + ρ
in (4) is decreasing in ρ we obtain φ′ (xt) ≤ φ (xt).
Increased spatial correlation diminishes the gain from
CSS and makes cooperation less likely.
• Varying α: For path loss exponents α, α′, if α ≥ α′ then
FE(x)  F ′E(x) and φ˜′ (xt) ≥ φ˜ (xt). Increasing the cost
distribution clearly inhibits diffusion.
B. Impact of Multiple Antennas
While the development thus far has considered the case
of single-antenna users, it is worthwhile to investigate the
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) scenario where the
ICRs are equipped with M antennas each. The most notable
impact is on the performance of the LSS and CSS likelihood
ratio tests. Specifically, we must now account for the correla-
tion between antennas at each ICR, in addition to the spatial
correlation across the ICRs.
Let the (M × 1) received vector at the ith ICR be
zi = si + ni
where si is the observation of the primary signal and ni ∼
CN (0, σ2nI) is complex additive Gaussian noise independent
of si. Due to the effect of antenna correlation, Σs,i =
E
{
sis
H
i
}
is a non-diagonal Hermitian matrix. Since each
ICR reports its local SNR under CSS, the SNR-maximizing
strategy in the multi-antenna scenario is to coherently combine
the SNRs measured at each of the M antennas via maximum-
ratio combining (MRC).
Given the eigenvalue decomposition Σs,i = UΛUH , the
optimal combining rule is to first decorrelate the received
signal as z˜i = UHzi, followed by MRC to yield the
output SNR γ˜i = z˜Hi z˜i
/
2σ2n [44]. Since U is unitary, the
distribution of γ˜i coincides with that of the combiner output
SNR γi = zHi zi
/
2σ2n in the uncorrelated antenna scenario.
The MRC output SNR γi is the sum of the M i.i.d. per-
antenna SNRs, each of which is a Gaussian random variable
(in dB) with mean µ(r) and variance σ2, which implies
γi ∼ N (Mµ(r),Mσ2). Assuming error-free SNR reports as
before, the binary hypothesis test under MIMO CSS is
H0 : y ∼ N
(
Mµ (r) 1, σ2MΣ
)
,
H1 : y ∼ N
(
Mµ (r + δ)1, σ2MΣ
)
.
The corresponding probability of false alarm can then be
written as
PMFA,CSS (c) = 1−Q
(√
M∆δ
σ
√
(1− ρ) c+ 2ρ
1 + ρ
+Q−1 (β)
)
(19)
and the false alarm probability under MIMO LSS is
PMFA,LSS = 1−Q
(√
M∆δ
σ
+Q−1 (β)
)
. (20)
Assume that the SNR/decision reports are conducted using
one out of the M antennas, such that the cost distribution is
unchanged. It then follows that vM (di, xt) ≥ v(di, xt) and
φM (xt) ≥ φ (xt), where the superscript ‘M’ denotes metrics
of the MIMO scenario. In other words, deploying multiple
antennas at the ICRs enhances the diffusion of cooperation in
the network. Furthermore, the trends and conclusions derived
in Sec. IV-A can be shown to also hold for the MIMO ICR
network.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of several numerical
experiments that investigate how conducive different decen-
tralized ICR networks are to the diffusion of cooperation.
The background AWGN variance at all receivers is assumed
to be unity. In addition, unless specified otherwise we set
the number of ICRs to n = 18, number of antennas
per ICR as M = 1, the network degree distribution as
[ P (1) = 0.37 P (2) = 0.33 P (3) = 0.3 ], D = 20m,
the detection probability target to β = 0.95, path-loss exponent
α = 2.5, proportionality constant c = 2, shadowing correlation
ρ = e−0.1R/(n−1) [11], sensing parameters δ = −0.09, σ =
3.3 [11], range R = 2m, and initial cooperation probability
x0 = 0.3.
Fig. 2 presents the evolution of diffusion metrics xt and ξt
over time for n = 18, R = 2m, and n = 40, R = 1.25m,
assuming M = 1 and an initial value of x0 = 0.2. We
observe that for the case n = 18, xt and ξt rapidly attain their
equilibrium values within four and six time steps, respectively,
and do not exhibit major changes from the initial values. On
the other hand, the scenario of n = 40 exhibits much more
dramatic increases over time since CSS is more attractive given
the lower energy cost due to R being smaller. The cooperation
metrics increase monotonically over time, despite ICRs having
the freedom to switch back to LSS from CSS in previous time
instants. This implies that cooperation is a mutually reinforcing
behavior for ICRs for whom the gain from CSS outweighs the
cost, in spite of their myopic view of the network.
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Fig. 3. Equilibrium probability of cooperation and relative density of
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In Fig. 3, equilibrium metrics xt and ξt are displayed as
the maximum inter-ICR communication range R increases.
As discussed in Sec. IV, an increase R raises the cost of
cooperation while the benefit from CSS remains unchanged,
and this is evident from the sharp decrease from 80% to
18% in relative density for M = 1. Interestingly, when
ICRs are equipped with an additional antenna, the increase
in R is not enough to offset the gain from CSS, and in fact
global cooperation is the equilibrium result for the scenario of
M = 2.
In Fig. 4, equilibrium metrics xt and ξt are displayed
for M = 1, 2, as a function of the primary user detection
probability constraint β. Interestingly, for less stringent values
of β, MIMO ICRs tend to abstain from cooperation since their
local false-alarm rate is correspondingly low and the benefit of
cooperation does not outweigh the cost. As β becomes more
stringent, there is clearly a change in MIMO ICR behavior for
β ≥ 0.8 where they become much more conducive to CSS.
In Fig. 5, equilibrium metrics xt and ξt are displayed as the
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number of ICR antennas is increased. The shadowing correla-
tion assumption strongly inhibits the increase of diffusion as
M goes from one to three, in contrast to the ideal uncorrelated
case of ρ = 0. Since M ≤ 3 for practical mobile terminals,
only minor gains in cooperative behavior are apparent from
deploying multiple antennas in a realistic fading environment.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section we touch upon several directions for further
research, ranging from network topology optimization to more
sophisticated ICR communication models and best-response
strategies.
A. Network Optimization
From the perspective of the ICR network designer, it may be
desirable to achieve a target equilibrium relative density ξt that
corresponds to a satisfactory ICR spectrum usage efficiency (in
8terms of network-wide false alarm rate). Of the parameters
listed in Sec. IV-A, the majority are either determined by
nature (ρ,α) or by spectrum regulations (β, sensing protocol),
which leaves the network degree distribution P (d) as a metric
that could be manipulated after ICR deployment. There are
potentially an infinite number of feasible degree distributions
that yield a target equilibrium density ξt. Bettstetter [34]
states that for a 2D-PPP spatial model with intensity α, the
probability that an arbitrary node has degree k for given range
R is
Pr (di = k) =
(
απR2
)k
k!
e−αpiR
2
from which we can determine the required range and the
corresponding ICR transmit power (assumed to be proportional
to R−α) such that this probability is arbitrarily close to 1.
Therefore, a na¨ive approach for creating a desired degree
distribution P (d) is to assign corresponding transmit powers
in the same proportion. Needless to say, such an approach ne-
glects intra-ICR interference, and a general solution remains an
open problem (see [45], [46] for more sophisticated analyses
of topology control in ad hoc networks).
B. Imperfect Inter-ICR Reports
While shadowing and noise impairments are considered
on the sensing channels, the assumption of noiseless inter-
neighbor reporting channels in this paper provides an upper
bound on the diffusion level of a decentralized ICR network.
This is because imperfect SNR reports will degrade the
performance of CSS, which in turn diminishes the return
function in (11) and thus the probability of cooperation in
(13). Nonetheless, low-rate SNR reports with sufficient error
control coding can approach the performance promised by the
ideal reporting channel assumption.
A related question worth answering is the following: given
the selfish assumption for the individual ICRs, do they have
an incentive to behave maliciously by intentionally reporting
false SNR values to their neighbors? The impact and detection
of falsified reports in cooperative spectrum sensing have been
studied extensively in recent literature [47], [48]. In our system
model, if a malicious ICR overhears its neighbor’s reports
and assumes they are truthful, it can combine them with
its own observation to privately compute PFA,CSS while
publicly reporting a false value. If these false reports increase
the publicly-known probability of false alarm, then the gain
from CSS is diminished and na¨ive ICRs are less likely to
choose cooperation. In the next iteration, the malicious ICR
is then less likely to receive SNR reports from its neighbors,
which discourages future false SNR reports and shows that
the diffusion game intrinsically rewards truthful behavior. The
security aspects of diffusion-based CSS therefore invite further
study, especially since the reputation-based and statistical false
report detection techniques in [47], [48] may not be applicable
under the mean-field assumption.
C. Beyond Myopic Strategies
We have seen that the myopic best response strategy in (14)
converges to the BNE of the diffusion game. On the other
hand, the adage “the more you know the better you can do”
certainly holds true for the diffusion game as well. Specif-
ically, if ICRs can obtain more information regarding their
local neighborhood, they can conceivably make better choices
regarding whether to take part in CSS. We briefly mention
two such possibilities. Firstly, side information regarding the
degrees of an ICR’s neighbors can be exploited by choos-
ing to perform CSS only with high-degree neighbors, since
higher-degree nodes enhance diffusion as shown in Sec IV-A.
The best response strategy would then become dependent on
the degrees of the neighbors [40]. Secondly, additional side
information regarding the cost realized at its neighbors can
also be useful to an ICR. Since the cost is assumed to be
realized once at the initialization of the diffusion process, an
ICR can exploit this information to predict future values of
xt and construct a best-response strategy with memory, as
opposed to the memoryless myopic best response approach in
the current model.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work investigates the diffusion of cooperative behavior
over time in a decentralized cognitive radio network with
selfish spectrum-sensing users. The system is modeled as a
partially connected network with a statistical distribution of
the degree of the users, who play their myopic best responses
to the actions of their neighbors at each iteration. We proved
the existence of an unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for
the diffusion game, provide its fixed-point characterization,
and show it is achievable with myopic best responses. The
impacts of network topology, channel fading statistics, and
sensing protocol on the outcome of the diffusion process have
been examined. Simulation results demonstrate how conducive
different network scenarios are to the diffusion of cooperation,
and we conclude with a discussion on additional refinements to
reporting channel models, security aspects, and best response
strategies.
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